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I. INTRODUCTION 
The new Securities Commission is charged inter alia with keeping 
under review the law and practice relating to securities in 
New Zealand. 1 One of its early tasks will be to decide how it 
should deal with the problem of insider trading and whether or not 
it should recommend to Government the enactment of legislation to 
control or prevent it. Whatever decision it makes will 
undoubtedly provoke a storm of controversy within the commercial 
community and it will be a matter of considerable interest to 
spectators to see how this controversy resolves itself. 
The problem of insider trading has attracted comprehensive 
legislative attention in many other countries including Australia, 
Canada the United States and the United Kingdom. (The U.K. 
legislation however was withdrawn prior to enactment). It has 
also attracted a high degree of controversy, with the result that 
it is perhaps unclear both if and to where we should move from our 
present position. 
On the one hand, moralists argue that insider trading is a special 
kind of fraud and ought to be controlled by legislation. On the 
other hand however, realists insist on proof of harm or damage to 
outsiders and finding none, arsue that the economic consequences 
of insider trading which may not be undesirable should dictate the 
issue of whether there is legislation or not. The rule caveat 
emptor they claim ought not to be lightly dismissed in arms length 
commercial transactions. 
This paper examines the force of th e se o pposing views in a 
New Zealand context and considers particularly the need for 
legislation in this area. 
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Broadly insider trading arises whenever someone having 
confidential price sensitive information concerning a company's 
-shares2 trades in those shares for personal benefit with someone 
not having the same information. 
The confidential information in question will usually be in the 
possession of the insider because of some connection which he has 
with the company in whose shares he deals (e.g. he might be a 
director, employee, or professional adviser to that company). 
He need not be one of these people however and someone is also an 
insider (a "tippee" to use the American expression) to whom 
information has been leaked by another insider. Insider trading 
covers both the situation where the information is favourable and 
shares are bought with a view to profit, and where the information 
is unfavourable and shares are sold to minimise losses. 
There are at present in New Zealand no legal sanctions aimed 
specifically at discouraging insider trading or providing those 
affected by it with suitable remedies. 2a However the rights of 
insiders to retain the benefits of insider trading are limited in 
some situations by the rules of equity and the common law. For 
2, Information is confidential if it has not been publicly disclosed; price 
sensitive if likely to materially affect the value of the shares when 
disclosure takes place. 
2(a) In its 19 78 code on takeovers the stock exchange purported to limit the 
rights of insiders {i.e. directors and advisers of a company) to engage in 
insider trading when armed LJith the knowledge of an undisclosed takeover 
bid. I do not regard these rules aB 'significant for the purposes of this 
paper however for the reason that they a"ppear to be "cosmetic" and nothing 
more. They do not bind directors in any way ( only their companies); they 
cannot provide a remedy for someone who deals with an insider; and 
generally they cannot be enforced since there are no punitive sanctions. 
The stock exchange does reserve to itself the right to "suspend 
quotations" if inside:r> tru.ding is apparent, though it is hardly likely to 
do so since the persons most likely to be affected are the innocent 
majority of shareholders, not inside dealing directors or advisers, who 
LJill already have sold if the information is bad, or bought if it is good 
and be wanting to hold their shares until the information is made public. 
Predictably the rules have not yet been aw lied against insider trading -
nor I suggest are they likely to be. 
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example where there are personal relationships between the 
parties, deliberate or negligent misstatements, or some explicit 
or assumed fiduciary responsibilities the courts are able to apply 
a degree of felt morality to the transaction and provide those to 
whom the misstatements are made, or to wnom duties of care are 
owed with suitable remedies and rights to recover losses. On the 
open market however where the parties will generally be dealing 
through agents, where they are at arms length, and where they are 
probably unaware of each other's identity there is little scope 
for equitable or common law rules to operate. 
There is certainly no general duty for insiders such as directors 
(except in special circumstances) to disclose to someone with whom 
they trade material inside information which might affect that 
person's decision whether or not to trade at the price offered by 
the insider. It is trite that such a duty of disclosure could be 
imposed by an appropriate legislative provision, and a situation 
created in which an insider was prevented from trading in the 
event that he was unable or unwilling to disclose material inside 
information. Whether this should be done however is not quite so 
clear and is the principal issue with which this paper is 
concerned. 
The Macarthur Committee's view on insider trading was that
3 
"Insider trading is inimical to a fair market in securities 
and results in a profit or other advantage by the employment 
of unconscionable methods." 
3. At paragraph 315. 
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The Committee proposed legislation for New Zealand similar to 
ss.124 and 124A of the Uniform Companies Act ena~ted in Australia 
following the report of the Eggleston Committee. Briefly these 
provisions make insider trading by directors, officers and 
employees of a company subject to criminal penalties, with civil 
liability for recovery of inside profits where an outsider has 
suffered a loss by paying more for the shares than he would have 
done had he been aware of the inside information. 
The Committee was obviously influenced by the moral and ethical 
aspects of insider trading. It did not consider the potential 
which presently exists for recovery from insiders, nor did it 
consider the numerous policy arguments for and against legislation, 
which in my view it should have done. 
Traditionally the argument for legislation has been placed on the 
footing that it is unethical and unfair. The JUSTICE 4 Committee 
for example in its 1972 report on Insider Trading said: 5 
"It is contrary to good business ethics that a man holding a 
position of trust in a company should use confidential 
information for his personal benefit., .• Good business 
ethics should be supported and reinforced by legal 
sanctions." 
Opposition to this view most often comes from those who look for 
some harm in the practice. One writer for example commenting on 
the JUSTICE report said: 6 
"However much one may sympathise with the moral argument for 
imposing such an embargo [on insider trading] it must be 
admitted that some of the economic consequences may not be 
4. JUSTICE is the British Section of the International Corrmission of Jur>ists, 
5. Paragraph 2. 
6. Kay 36MLR 189 (1973). 
s. 
desirable ... [the point] is that it would be unwise to 
introduce a prohibition on insider trading before some 
attempt to prognasticate the economic repercussions of such 
a prohibition has been made." 
It was submitted to the Macarthur Committee that insider trading 
was not a problem in New Zealand and that legislation was not 
therefore necessary to keep it under control. The Committee for 
\ reasons of its own however did not accept this submission. 
Nevertheless it is clear that the need for legislation is less 
strong in New Zealand and the insider abuses less obvious than for 
example in Australia in the late 1960s. 7 While there is no 
empirical evidence of the likely extent of insider trading in 
New Zealand it is probably less of a problem and the market 
generally less volatile than in other countries. Legislation 
therefore should be justified before it is enacted
1
in terms of 
a practical and a theoretical need. 
The Committee I feel should have looked at the problem of insider 
trading in terms of: 
(a) its present treatment at law; 
(b) the need for legislation having regard to the likely 
extent of the problem and current academic 
controversy; 
(c) the practicability of eoforcement and the undesirable 
realities of partial enforcement. 
Had it done so its conclusion may well have been different. 
It is proposed to consider each of these issues. 
7. See Ba:ct "The Rae Report - Quo Vadis". 
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II. THE PRESENT LAW 
( a) Corporate recovery of inside profits 
It is trite law that trustees, directors and others owing 
fiduciary duties may not use information for personal benefit 
which comes to them in their fiduciary capacity. 8 If they do then 
they are strictly liable to account in equity. In the context of 
recovery by a company of an insider's profit, this accountability 
could be based on a direct breach of the basic trust principle 
that "a person in a fiduciary capacity may not make a profit out 
of his trust; 9 on the fact of a conflict of interest; or on the 
basis that information, as property belonging to the company, may 
not be misused or misapplied by insiders without giving rise to 
liability for misappropriation of company assets. 10 
The duty to account for inside profits is not limited merely to 
directors of a company. It extends to its employees 11 and to 
tippees as we11 12 provided that they knowingly and deliberately 
take advantage of the inside information for their personal 
benefit. 13 Their liability to the company can be based either on 
a direct involvement in a breach of a positive fiduciary duty as 
in Canadian Aero Services Ltd v. O'Malley14 or as constructive 
B. This proposivion is we U established by cases such as G. E. Smith Ltd v. 
Smith [1952] NZLR 4?0; Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 
3?8; Keech v. Sanford 25 ER 223; Cook v. Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554; Boardman 
v. Phipps [196?] 2 AC 48; Industrial Development Consultants v. Cooley 
[19?2] 2 All ER 162; Abbe~Glen Property Corp. v. Stwnborg 85 DLR 3d 35; 
Queensland Mines Ltd v. H son [19?8.] 18 ALR 1. The proposition is f-ixed 
also in U.S. lCllJ e.g. Mosser v. Darrow 041 US 26?, (1951); Diamond v. 
Oreomuno 248 NE 2d 910 (1968). 
9. Per Lord Upj din Boardman v. Phipps 1966 3 All ER ?21, ?51. 
10. On information as corrpany property see Boardm:m v. Phipps [1966] 3 All ER 
?21 Bell Houses Ltd v. City Wall Properties Ltd [1966] 2 Q B 656, Diamond 
v. Oreomuno 248 NE 2d 910, Peso Silver Mines Ltd v. Cropper 1966 58 DLR 
1. Also Gower "Principles of Modern Company law" (3rd edition) pp 555-56. 
11. Seager v. Copydex Ltd [196?] 2 All ER 415. 
12. Seager v. Copydex Ltd [196?] 2 All ER 415. Canadian Aero Services Ltd v. 
Omalley 40 DLR 3d 3?1. 
13, See Competitive Insurance Co, v. wvies Investments Ltd 19 ?5 1 WLR 1240, 
14. 40 DLR ed 3?1, also Schein v. Chasen 4?8 F 2d 81? (19?3). 
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trustees where the circumstances are such that they ought to have 
been aware of an involvement in a breach of such a duty. 15 
' S k ' R 1 (H ' ) d G 11' 16 ' 'f' d Viscount an ey in ega astings Lt v. u iver Justi ie 
the rule for accountability when he said': 
"The general rule of equity is that no-one who has duties of 
a fiduciary nature to perform is allowed to enter into 
engagements in which he has or can have a personal interest 
conflicting with the interests of those he is bound to 
protect." 
Admittedly in the context of insider trading the conflict is not 
readily apparent and may not even exist at all since a company is 
legally prevented from purchasing its own shares. Cases such as 
Boardman v. Phipps 17 and I.D.C. v. Cooley 18 however show clearly 
that proof of loss is not a condition precedent for fiduciary 
accountability. In Boardman a solicitor who acted for a family 
trust and one of the beneficiaries who acted with him were liable 
to account for the benefits received by them through the use of 
confidential information acquired whilst representing the 
interests of the trust. It was of no significance that the trust 
was unable to use the information itself. Similarly in Cooley a 
director was liable to account to his company for the profit made 
by personally undertaking a contract which would never have been 
awarded to the company. 
15. As for exa,mp7,e in Selangor United Ruhber Estates v. Craddock CRo. 31 
[1968] 2 All ER 1073, Karak Rubber lb~ v~ Burden CNo. 2) I1972J 1 All ER 
1210, RowZandson v. National Westminster Bank [1978] 3 All ER 370. 
16. [1942] 1 All ER 378, 381. 
17. [1966] 3 All ER 721. 
18. [1972] 2 All ER 162. 
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In a Canadian case, Peso Silver Mines v. Cropper, 19 the court 
recognised the harshness of the rule and the seeming unjust 
enrichment of the cestui que trust which cases like Cooley, 
Boardman and Regal appear to countenance, and it was held that 
where a company decided in a bona fide exercise of its 
discretion not to proceed with a proposed development of a 
mining lease, two of its directors who subsequently undertook 
the development with their own resources were not liable to 
account for their profits. The case is clearly just on the 
facts though unfortunately contrary to general principles and 
the authorities. Much as its result may be desirable it is not 
likely to be followed in other commonwealth countries, or even 
in Canada following the recent case of Abbey Glen Property Corp 
v. Stumborg20 21 
The basis for the accountability appears to be not so much to 
award damages to the company for harms it has suffered, but 
rather to reimburse unauthorised and improperly taken profits. 
In Diamond v. Oreomuno 22 an American court attempted to show 
corporate harm by insider trading by way of a "loss of public 
acceptance and marketability of its shares". The reasoning of the 
Diamond Court is not compelling however and seems not to have been 
accepted elsewhere or in other cases. 23 
19. [1966] 58 DLR1, 
20. 85 DLR 3d 35 (1978). 
. 
21. For a discusswn of the Peso case see Gaulir pp 537-539, Beck "The Saga of 
Peso Silver Mines" (1971) 49 Can Bar Rev 80. 
22. 248 NE 2d 910 (1968). 
23. Though note Wright 1971 NZULR 209, 22? where it is suggested that the 
Diamond v. Oreomuno decision should "be accepted by our courts as 
expressing the correct modern view of the detrimental effects of insider 
trading on a corrpany". I disagree with Mr Wright on this point. 
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An action for recovery may be commenced by the company itself24 
or by way of a shareholders derivative action should the company 
fail to act. 25 
(b) Shareholder recovery of insider profits 
The extension of directors' and other insiders' fiduciary 
responsibilities to include shareholders simpliciter has hitherto 
been suppressed at common law by the single, much criticised 
decision of Swinfen Eady Jin Percival v. Wright. 26 
This case is taken, except in special circumstances~ to exclude 
the possibility of any civil action by an aggrieved shareholder 
who has sold shares to a director who knows that their value is 
likely to increase as a result of undisclosed inside information. 
It also precludes recovery by an external investor buying shares 
from an insider who knows that the value of those shares is likely 
to drop. 
In Percival v. Wright directors had purchased shares from the 
plaintiffs without disclosing a possible takeover bid from another 
company. The bid eventually proved abortive but nevertheless the 
plaintiffs sought recission of the sale for a breach of fiduciary 
duty by the directors. This claim was denied however for the 
reason that such duties were owed by directors only to their 
companies, and not to individual members. 
24. Typical e:rx:zmples are Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver 1942 1 All ER 3?8, 
Diamond v. Oreomuno (above). 
25. E.g. Cook v. Deeks 1916 AC 554, Wallensteiner v. Moir 19?4 3 All ER 21?. 
See also Beck 52 Can Bar Rev 159 (19 74), Wedderburn 195 7 Camb LJ 194, 
Yoran 7 IS LR 217~ 232. It is in this context that the issue whether 
information is corporate property or not is significant. 
26 . [19 0 2] 2 eh 4 21 . 
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In his judgment Swinfen Eady J said27 -
"The purchasing directors were under no obligation to 
disclose to their vendor shareholqers the negotiations which 
eventually proved abortive. The contrary view would place 
directors in a most invidious position if they could not buy 
or sell shares, a premature disclosure of which might be 
against the best interests of the company." 
It was obviously significant in the case that there was no 
question of unfair dealing and that it was the shareholders who 
had approached the directors, naming the price at which they 
wished to sell. These features of the case make it very similar 
to present day stock market transactions and it may be an argument 
against legislation in that context that few critics have 
suggested that Percival v. Wright did not do justice as between 
the parties on the particular facts involved. 
The rule from Percival v. Wright however operates particularly 
harshly in the context of small closely held private companies, 
though equity and the common law have gone a considerable way 
toward mitigating this unfairness. Generally it will only be in 
the situations where there is insider trading simpliciter (i.e. no 
direct contract between buyer and seller) that an aggrieved 
27. [1902] 2cii 426 
Note that the "invidious position" to which SWinfen Eady J refers is 
exactly that created by Rule 10-B-5 in the U.S. Securities Act. Under 
this rule if company directors (or other insiders) have confidential 
information which they cannot or should not disclose., then they cannot 
trade either. If they do then they are licib le to that person with whcm 
they trade - Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. S.E.C. 394 US 976 (1969). The 
fallaey of SWinfen Eady J's logic seems to he in the doubtful asswrrption 
that directors must be free to buy and sell shares at all times and that 
the secrecy of corporate information derrands that no Zia.bi lity attaches to 
corporate insiders. 
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shareholder will be denied recovery from an insider under the 
rule. Whenever there are super-added fiduciary responsibilities 
or duties of care in the insider toward the person with whom he 
deals, as for example where they are dealing face to face, or 
' where the insider misleads or misadvises, or exerts undue 
influence, there is considerable scope in equity and in tort for 
recovery by that person. 
The special circumstances doctrine. 
If, having regard to the special circumstances of a case directors 
(or other insiders) can by their conduct be regarded as having 
undertaken fiduciary responsibilities towards shareholders they 
will be liable to account for any profits if they fail to disclose 
material inside information. Decided cases indicate that fiduciary 
responsibilities will exist wherever there is actual or 
constructive fraud, undue influence, or conflicting self-interest 
in the insider vis-a-vis the person with whom he deals. 
In Allen v. Hyatt 28 a Canadian case on appeal to the Privy 
Council, directors of a company were authorised as agents to 
negotiate a favourable amalgamation with another company and were 
given options to purchase shares at a fixed price. On the resale 
of those shares a substantial profit resulted which the directors 
resisted paying to the original shareholders on the basis of 
Percival v. Wright. The Privy Council took the view that in the 
circumstances the directors were acting as agents for the 
shareholders when they took the op tic;ms: 11 The directors must have 
be taken to have held themselves out to ' the individual 
shareholders as acting for them on the same footing as they were 
acting for the company itself, that was as agents. 11 They were 
held to be trustees of the profits for the shareholders. 
28. 1914 30 TLR 444. 
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In Nocton v. Lord Ashburton29 a solicitor misadvising his client 
to release a security over land was in breach of ~n imposed 
fiduciary duty when it transpired that he had a personal interest 
in the release of that security which conflicted with that of his 
client. There was not actual fraud here: "Not moral fraud in the 
ordinary sense, but breach of the sort of obligation which is 
enforced by a court that from the beginning regarded itself as a 
court of conscience. 1130 He was liable as a constructive trustee , 
for his "constructive fraud". The courts reasoning is similar to 
that adopted by American courts in Strong v. RepideJl and Taylor 
v. Wright. 32 
Transa_ctions will also be set aside where one party has been 
induced to make the arrangement by someone exercising "undue 
33 influence" over him. In Lloyds Bank v. Bundy for instance a 
guarantee and a legal charge over land were set aside because the 
guarantor placed reliance on his bank manager's advice. In the 
matter of a security taken by the bank, the bank manager was in 
breach of an imposed fiduciary duty by not ensuring that the 
customer took independent legal advice. The bank therefore was 
unable to retain the benefit of the transaction. Similarly in 
Tufton v. Sperni 34 the court set aside a contract for the sale of 
a house since the plaintiff reposed absolute confidence in the 
defendant because of their mutual involvement in a scheme to 
29, {1914] AC 932, 
30. Per Visrount Haldane L, C. at p, 954. Interestingly the measure of recovery 
in this cme was the loss or harm caused to the client cf. Boardman v. 
Phipps Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver~ I,D.C, v. Cooley, Where the 
measure of recovery was the benefit obtained by the fiduciary. 
31, (1909) 213 us 419. 
32, (1945) 69 Cal App 2d 371. The corrmon law in the United States however has 
been largely superseded by S.E.C. regulations and various "blue sky" 
securities laws in each of the states. 
33. [19?4] 3 All ER ?5?. 
34, 1952 2 TIR 516. 
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benefit the Moslem religion. Evershed MR found there to be a 
breach of: "The duties of care and confidence which may be 
imposed ••• as a result of the particular relationship which 
f h . l . ..35 emerges rom t e spec1a circumstances. 
The special circumstances doctrine was considered and applied 
recently by the Court of Appeal in Coleman v. Myers 36
 where 
two directors in a closely held private company misled and 
misadvised shareholders in the context of a takeover bid, to 
accept a lower price for their shares than was appropriate. The 
directors failed to disclose material inside information to the 
shareholders with a resulting economic benefit to themselves. The 
issues before the court were: 
(a) whether the directors owed any duties to the 
shareholders; and 
(b) whether they were in breach of those duties in acting 
as they did. 
At first instance Mahon J found that the directors did owe 
fiduciary duties to shareholders simpliciter, and he found 
Percival v. Wright to have been incorrectly decided.
37 He found 
however, that on the facts these duties had not been breached. 
The Court of Appeaf8did not go this far however since it was not 
necessary for it to do so. Cooke J said
39 "In principle the case 
35 , Ibid 524, 
36, 19 77 2 NUR 225. 
3?. pp 274- 275. 
38. Comprising Cooke , Woodhouse and Casey JJ , 
39. At p, 340, 
14. 
falls within the broad class of fiduciary relationships arising 
from special facts". This resulted he stated from:
40 "The family 
character of the company; the position of father and son in the 
company and in the family; their high degree of inside knowledge; 
' 
and the way in which they went about the takeover and persuasion 
of shareholders." 
The Court found the directors to be in breach of their 
responsibilities to the shareholders for a number of reasons. In 
particular they were obliged not to make statements on matters 
material to the sale which were deliberately or carelessly 
misleading. Moreover they were under a positive duty to disclose 
to the shareholders material information as to which they were 
aware the shareholders had no knowledge. 
It was ac c epted that the directors, having decided to make a 
recommendation in terms of the Companies Amendment Act 1963 were 
under a positive duty of care to the shareholders. It was a 
significant feature of the case however that at least one member 
of the court
41 was prepared to find an alternative duty on the 
42 43 44 
basis of Hedley Bryne v. Heller and M.L.C. v. Evatt, 
since the directors had financial interests in the transaction on 
which they gave advice. It had been suggested
45 that these cases 
would not apply against inside dealing directors. This view must 
now be doubted.
46 
4 0 . At p. J JO . 
41. Cooke J at p.340, 
42. 1963 2 All ER 575. 
43. 19 71 1 AZZ ER 150 (161). 
44. See discussion 1977 2 NZLR 340. 
45. See Tom Hadden, "Company L:n,; and Capitalism" (2 ed) 252. 
46. The significance of this however may only be theoretical since it is 
difficult to imagine instances in which the tort will have been proved 
where there is not also fiduciary duties arising from special 
cirCWTB tances. There may be differences though in the measure of recovery 
in tort and in equity i.e. damages versus accountabi Zit;y for profits. 
The equitable remedy however is not a rigid one., e.g. Nocton v. 
Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932 - recovery of losses suffered cf, Boardman v. 
Phipps, I.D.C. v. Cooley - repayment of profits. 
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The Court of Appeal was obviously reluctant in this case to lay 
down any general test as to when fiduciary duties .will arise in 
directors towards shareholders. Obviously however the "closeness" 
of the arrangement; the inequality of bargaining power; and the 
confidence reposed in the directors by the shareholders were 
particularly significant features. The court recognised the 
principle well established in other cases 47 that where one party 
to a transaction offers advice to the other he must ensure that 
the advice is not deliberately or negligently misleading or 
incorrect, and that it is honest. Moreover it was noted that the 
standard of conduct expected from directors could vary according 
to the circumstances: "in some cases it would be necessary to give 
an explicit warning and a great deal of information and in another 
48 there would be no duty to speak at all." 
Few can doubt that on the facts the decision in the case was just 
as between the parties involved. There are a number of specific 
difficulties which remain ho..,rever and a number of matters which 
are still unresolved. The case has been criticised by several 
writers 49 and in particular exception may be taken to the court's 
treatment of the recission/damages issue and its treatment of 
Percival v. Wright. 
With the greatest respect to the majority view on the question of 
damages or recission it is suggested that the view of Woodhouse J 
is to be preferred and that recission should have been granted. 
Both Cooke and Casey JJ thought in regard to the claims based on 
fraud, negligence and breach of duty that it would not be 
practically just to grant recission for the reason that "it would 
be flying in the face of commercial reality to suggest that 
returning shares to the appellants ... would be putting them back 
4?. E.g. Gething v. Kilner 19?2 1 All ER 166 - also Essa Petrolewn Co. Ltd v. 
Mardon 19?6 2 All ER 5, 
48. Per Woodhouse J. 
49. E.g. Rider 40 MLR, 41 MLR 585, Iko..Json 8 NZULR 256. 
in the same position 
however, English v. 
relied upon by Cooke 
16. 
' 50 as before they sold." In one recent case 
Dedham Vale Properties Ltd 51 the authorities 
J as supporting his finding for recission 
were dismissed as being inconclusive on this point. Moreover one 
writer has questioned whether an award o~ damages is possible at 
all for the breach of a fiduciary duty: 52 "Certainly in its 
exclusive jurisdiction chancery did not award damages for breach 
of a fiduciary duty." 
An important aspect of the case is that it recognised the breach 
of morality and ethics which had taken place. One of the factors 
cited by Cooke J as giving rise to a fiduciary duty was "The 
directors high degree of inside knowledge." 
One writer has commented, and I agree that: 52 
"Perhaps one of the most interesting elements in the Court 
of Appeal's judgment is the recognition of the special 
position of shareholders in small closely held companies and 
the intra-corporate relationship of confidence which may 
contribute to a finding of a special relationship in 
equity." 
It is manifestly clear that the decision in Coleman v. Myers, like 
the decisions in Diamond v. Oreomuno 53 and Canadian Aero Services 
v. O'Malley 54 was an overt attempt by the Court to do justice as 
between the parties and to avoid the unjust enrichment of the 
directors to the direct and felt detriment of the shareholders. 
50. Per Casey J [19??] 2 NZLR 3?9. 
51. [19?8] 1 WLR 93. 
52. Rider 41 MLR 588 (19?8). 
53. 248 NE 910. 
54. 40 DLR 3d 3?1. 
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The case will undoubtedly be of considerable significance in many 
subsequent cases of insider trading in shares in closely held 
private companies. It is unlikely however to have any impact in 
the context of stock exchange dealings where none of the special 
circumstances are present which were reli'ed upon in Coleman v. 
Myers. Where for example the insider does not influence or induce 
the sale and where the parties are not dealing face to face it is 
difficult to envisage liability arising for insider trading. It 
is not clear however that it should. One group has suggested in 
the context of such dealings that: 55 "There are serious 
objections both practical and of equity to giving the other party 
to the contract a right of action. The practical objection is 
that the stock jobbing system makes it virtually impossible for 
any vendor to identify the purchaser and vice versa. The moral 
objection is that the matching of vendor and purchaser is entirely 
random and there is no obvious justification for giving a vendor 
who happens to have sold his shares to an insider a remedy which 
is not available to vendors who sold similar shares at the same 
time and at the same price to outsiders." 
Before considering this however it is intended to briefly canvass 
the laws which have been enacted in other countries to deal with 
market transactions. 
III THE LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
An increasing number of countries it seems are finding it 
necessary or desirable to limit the ~xtent of market insider 
activities by specific legislative provisions purporting to 
prevent insider trading and imposing more severe duties of 
55. JUSTICE repor>t at paragraph 2, 
18. 
disclosure on corporate insiders. I propose to consider briefly 
the extent of some of the·se provisions, their effect, and the 
market conditions which made them necessary. In particular the 
securities laws in the United States, Capada, Australia and the 
United Kingdom are of special significance in a New Zealand 
context because of the similarity of their general laws to our 
56 
own. 
(a) The United States Provisions 
Market insider activity is regulated in the United States by the 
Securities Exchange Act 1934. This is a comprehensive Act, part 
of Roosevelt's "new deal" for America, enacted following the 
economic crisis and the stock market collapse of 1928/29. Its 
ostensible purpose seems to have been to restore damaged investor 
confidence in the integrity and honesty of the stock market. 
Whether it was successful in this or not is not exactly clear. 
Broadly, section 16(a) of the Act requires that details of share 
holdings and share dealings be filed with the S.E.C. by any 
officer or director of a company or by anyone holding more than 
10% of any class of equity security of the company.
57 Section 
16(b) provides that any profit made within a six month period by 
any one of these persons must be accounted for to the company 
whether or not there has been disclosure made under s.16(a) and 
whether or not there has been any misused inside information. 
Recovery can be made by either the ~ompany itself or by any member 
of the company on its behalf if the insider does not voluntarily 
disgorge his profit. 
56. For a discussion of l,,aJ.,Js in other countries see for example Rider, 94 
SALJ 43? (South Africa), 1? Malaya LR 310 (Hong Kong) 26 Int & Comp LQ 
619 (Fronce). 
5?. Cf. s.195 Companies Act 1955. 
19. 
Section 16 is open to several clear criticisms. It is arbitrary: 
the insider is liable even if he can show that there is no unfair 
misuse of information if he resells within six months at a profit. 
If he sells after six months however there is no liability even if 
he has clearly abused his inside position. There is no guarantee 
against evasion by "mutual back scratching" by insiders in 
different companies, or by trading through relatives and friends. 
Nor does it apply to tippees taking advantage of inside information. 
Nevertheless it hits by and large the people who ought to be hit 
and it overcomes the problem of having to prove that an insider is 
trading on the basis of inside information. It generally 
restricts trading by those most likely to possess and to use 
inside information to long term dealings. It is a deterrent to 
insider trading more than anything else and even when a bona fide 
deal is caught by the section, the insider only loses his profit. 
There is no "penalty" imposed where there is no misuse of 
confidential information. 
The scope and effect of section 16 is supplemented by Rule lO(b)S 
of the Securities Act. This provides inter alia: 
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly -
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud; 
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make that statement not misleading; 
(3) To engage in any act, practice or course of 
business which would operate as a fraud or deceit on 
any person. 
20. 
This rule imposes a positive duty on an insider to publicly 
disclose material facts known to him by virtue of his inside 
position. If he cannot or should not disclose the information 
because of duties owed to his company then he should not trade 
either until public disclosure can be made : S.E~·c. v. 
58 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. The duty applies both where the insider 
buys and sells shares: 
"It is almost true to say that sales and purchases by 
insiders have become contracts of the utmost good faith 
demanding disclosure of all material facts."
59 
An insider for the purposes of Rule lO{b)S includes anyone who 
possesses inside information and is not limited to directors and 
management officers. It clearly includes tippees. Information is 
material if it might reasonably be expected to affect the market 
value of the shares and to influence investor decisions whether to 
buy or sell them. 
The recipients of the disgorged profits under lO{b)S are the 
affected shareholders who suffer a loss, not the company in whose 
shares the trading took place. In Texas Gulf Sulphur the problem 
of identification of those affected was overcome by the creation 
of an escrow fund of the disgorged profits against which all of 
the affected shareholders could claim. 
(b) Australian Provisions 
All States and Territories {except\Ta~mania) regulate the dealing 
in a company's shares by persons having an inside knowledge of 
58, 1968 401 F. 2d 833. 
59, Ibid at 85?. Cf. the rule uberrim::ie fidei presently applicable to 
insurance contracts. Such positive duties to disclose material facts are 
unusual in commercial non-fiduciary situations, 
21. 
that company's affairs. There are presently two separate Acts 
which determine the extent of this regulation: the Uniform 
Companies Act60 which closely follows the re.commendations of the 
Eggleston Committee, and the Uniform SeGurities Industry Act 197561 
which goes some-what further. 
Both Acts are a response to the highly volatile securities market 
in speculative mining companies in the late 1960s62 and both 
recognise the principle established by the Eggleston Committee 
that: 
II where [insiders] make improper use of confidential 
information the law should at least provide a penalty 
commensurate with the extent of the wrong committed." 
They tackle this objective in different ways however. 
On the one hand sections 124 and 124A of the Uniform Companies Act 
impose both civil and criminal penalties upon any officer of a 
company (i.e. a director, secretary or employee) who makes 
improper use of information acquired by virtue of his position to 
gain an advantage for himself or for any other person. Broadly 
the provisions make an insider liable for loss suffered by a 
person to whom he sells shares if the other pays more for them 
than he would have paid if the information had been publicly 
known. A tippee is not an insider for the purposes of this Act, 
though in line with the Eggleston Committee's recommendations the 
officer of the company involved is ~iable to the outsider with 
whom the tippee traded. 63 An inside dealing company officer is 
60. In force in S.A., N~T., A.C.T. 
61. In force i-n N.S.W., Qld, Vic., W.A. 
62. See R. Ba.xt "The Rae Report - Quo Vad:is''~ 
63. The Corrunittee noted: 11We see no good reason lihy an officer who misuses 
confidential information by telling his friends to se U should not be 
liable to those liho bought from those fri ends. 11 
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also liable under the Act, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding 
$2,000. For information to fall within the provisions it must be 
specific; confidential and material (market-wise). 64 
On the other hand section 112 of the Securities Industries Act 
1975 provides inter alia that: 
" •.• a person who is, or at any time in the preceding six 
months has been, connected with a body corporate shall not 
deal in any securities of that body corporate if by reason 
of [the connection] he is in possession of information that 
is not generally available but, if it were, would be likely 
to materially affect the price of those securities." 
This prohibits all dealing in a company's shares by an insider65 
until the price sensitive information becomes publicly known. In 
addition, unlike the Uniform Companies Act, it applies both to 
where the insider buys and sells shares on the basis of 
confidential information. The prohibition on trading also extends 
toward shares in 
gets information 
for the purposes 
offence. 6 8 
other companies in relation to which the insider 
b f h · · ' 66 A t. ' d y reason o is position. ippee is treate 
f h A · 'd 
67 d · · · d o t e et as an insi er an tipping is ma e an 
The sanctions against insider trading are civil liability to the 
outsider to the extent of the profit made; accountability to the 
company for profits taken; and criminal liability involving a fine 
not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment. 69 70 
64. Note !!1i!!:!!:._ v. Triguboff [19 76] 1 NSWLR 5 88. 
65. Defined later in the section to include officers, directors, employees, 
professional advisers and substantial shareholders (more than 10%) of the 
company) (s. ll2(8)). 
66. Section ll2(2). 
67. Section ll2(3). 
68. Section U2( 5). 
69. Sections U3 and U4. 
70, The Uniform Securities Industries Act 19 75 is closely modelled on the U.K. 
Companies Bill introduced by the Heath Government in 19 73 and revived in 
2 3. 
(c) Canadian Provisions 
Provisions purporting to deal with insider trading are contained 
in the Securities Acts of Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, British 
Columbia and Saskatchewan. Section 113 of the Ontario statute 
which is typical of the others provides inter alia: 
"Every insider of a corporation or associate ... of such 
insider who ... makes use of any specific confidential infor-
mation for his own benefit or advantage ••• is 1 iable to 
compensate any person or company for any direct loss 
suffered •.. as a result •.. unless [the] information was 
known or ought reasonably to have been known to [that] 
h . f h t t· .. " person ..• at t e time o t e ransac ion., .. 
The law is very similar to and has developed from the United 
States provisions. It applies to all corporate insiders 
(directors, employees, advisers etc.) and to their affiliates or 
associates (tippees). To give rise to liability the information 
complained of must be "specific confidential information" which 
the insider makes use of for his own benefit. 71 The information 
must also be such as would, if generally known, materially affect 
the value of the securities. 
19?8. It is comprehensive and the penalties are severe. As yet there are 
no reported decisions on the Act which is perhaps in itself comment on the 
provisions and the likely effect which they will have. It is not yet 
clear however just how the Act has affected the securities market nor 
whether it has prevented insider trading or merely encouroged those 
engaging in it to seek less detectable methods. 
?1. Note the case of Green v. Charterhouse Corporation 19?3 2 O.R. 6?? on the 
meaning of "specif1,c confidential informa.tion 11 - also !!1iE!!:... v. Triguboff 
[19?6] 1 NSWLR 588. See also S. R. Bailey ABLR 2?2-2?4. 
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Liability of insiders for insider trading is solely to the 
person from whom the shares are purchased or sold, or to the 
company in relation to which the person involved stands as 
insider. 
72 
In Ontario at least, there must also be extensive monthly 
disclosure of changes in beneficial shareholdings and share 
dealings by all insiders of a company including its directors, 
senior officers, each of the five highest paid employees, and 
officers of companies which are themselves insiders of that 
company. 73 
It is not clear how effective the Canadian provisions are or what 
the market conditions were which made them necessary. Nor is it 
clear the extent to which they are enforced. As in Australia, 
there have been very few reported cases on the operation of the 
provisions. 
(d) United Kingdom Provisions 
Bills to implement controls on market insider trading were 
introduced in the United Kingdom in 1973 and 1978. They were 
drafted consequent to the report of the Jenkins Conunittee and to 
two white papers - "The conduct of company directors"; 74 and 
"changes in company law". 75 Unfortunately, for reasons political 
neither bill was enacted into law. 
72. I have no infoY'TTlation on t he ot her atates. 
73. See Ontario stock exchange ru les on disclosure of beneficial interes t s. 
7 4. CMMD 7 0 3 7. 
75. CMND 7291. 
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They were however to have contained a prohibition on insider 
trading in a company's shares by anyone connected .with it during 
the preceding six months who was in possession of material inside 
information, and a prohibition on dealing by tippees who obtained . 
information from one of those persons. 11 Connected person II was 
defined in the 1978 Bill as meaning an officer or employee of the 
issuer of the shares or a related company or any person who 
occupied a position which might reasonably be expected to have 
given him access to inside information. Inside information was 
information which (a) was not generally available; and (b) would 
if it were so available be likely to materially affect the price 
of those securities. 
The bill was aimed solely at market dealings or private dealings 
in listed securities and it was very comprehensive. It proposed 
both criminal and civil penalties for persons guilty of insider 
trading. The criminal penalty was to be a fine of up to $2,000 
and imprisonment. The civil penalty was to involve that the 
undisclosed inside information be treated as a fraudulent 
misrepresentation giving rise to appropriate remedies in damages 
or recission. The legislation generally was to replace the 
existing body of legal and extra-legal rules existing in Britain.
76 
IV WHY REGULATE FOR MARKET INSIDER ACTIVITIES IN NEW ZEALAND? 
Where the parties to a securities transaction are dealing on the 
open market either at arms length a~ strangers or through an 
intermediary such as a stock broker it' is manifestly clear that 
?6. See Misrepresentation Act 196?; Regulations of the London Stock Exchange 
Prevention of Fmud (Investments) Act 1958; City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers (1969); Protection of Depositors Act 1963; Corrpanies Act 196?. 
??. For a detailed discussion of the terms of the 19?8 Bill see: Walmsley NLJ 
Janua:ry 1978 p, 15, October 19?8, 1051, Rider NLJ December 19?8 1236. 
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the law presently provides no remedy if one of them is motivated 
to trade by material inside information which he does not disclose 
to the other. To avoid liability a market insider has only to 
avoid making material misrepresentations or misstatements of fact. 
He is under no positive duty as well toward the other party to 
disclose material facts. 
As can be seen from the above discussion however, it is the 
principle purpose of anti-insider trading legislation to impose 
such a duty on him and render him liable in the event that he does 
not disclose. 
This would appear to be out of line with normally accepted rules 
of practice in commercial non-fiduciary situations and whether it 
should be done therefore should depend upon clear proof of 
necessity in the specific context in which it is sought to be 
imposed. In the context of the New Zealand securities market it 
is my view that this proof is difficult to sustain and that the 
presumption, on balance, should be in favour of the status quo. 
(a) Policy Bases for a Ban on Market Insider Trading 
There is presently a diversity of academic opinion on the need to 
outlaw insider trading and the basis on which this should be done. 
The principal argument advanced in favour of such a ban is that 
insider trading is unethical and dishonest and ought not to go 
unchecked. Other arguments stress its unfairness and the need for 
market dealings to take place fro.man initial point of equality, 
and the need to promote investor confidence in the integrity of 
the market in order to encourage people to invest. None of these 
arguments however are particularly compelling. 
27. 
(i) Market morality 
It is clear in other commercial situations that legislation is 
presently in force which imposes certain.minimum standards of 
conduct on parties to a transaction in which one of them, by 
reason of his relative bargaining strength, could be in a position 
to act oppresively and for his personal benefit to the 
corresponding detriment of the other. Tenancy laws, 78 insurance 
laws, 79 various consumer laws 80 and laws relating to carriage81 
are but a few examples and by analogy those opposed to insider 
trading claim legislation would also be appropriate to establish 
certain minimum standards of conduct for directors and others who 
misuse the confidence of their positions for purely personal 
reasons. 
Moral opposition to insider trading in market situations rests on 
two principle elements: first the existence of a relationship 
giving access directly or indirectly to information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal 
benefit of anyone; and second, the inherent unfairness involved 
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is 
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. The argument for 
legislation in this context is initially an attractive one since 
it is clear that the conduct of many insiders, though not 
sufficiently serious to constitute fraud, is not entirely able to 
be justified on an ethical basis. 
78. E.g. Property La,J Act 1952. 
79. E.g. Life Insurance Act 1908, Insurance Law RefoT'171 Act 1977. 
80. E.g. Sale of Goods Act 1908, Chattels Transfer Act 1924, Minors Contracts 
Act 196 7, Money Lenders Act 190 8. 
81. E.g. Carriage of Goods Bill 1979. 
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Traditionally however the government has been reluctant to 
interfere in strictly commercial matters knowing that if it does, 
business profitability and economic growth will suffer. Anti 
insider trading legislation is clearly in the nature of a consumer 
confidence and protection measure, and the issue whether to 
legislate on a moral basis relates solely to whether there is a 
need to do so. In my view there is not. A large proportion of 
the investment in equity shares is by institutional investors and 
few would suggest for example that an insurance company or a bank 
would need protection from the market activities of a single 
unscrupulous insider. In relation to the individual market 
investor the argument has considerable force that if he is foolish 
enough to enter a lions den he deserves to be eaten, particularly 
since he does not really suffer a "loss" of anything which could 
be regarded as his property. 
While a shareholder who deals with an insider may justifiably have 
a sense of grievance because of the ethical doubts concerning the 
misuse of confidential information, there is no way in which this 
sense of grievance can be translated into a justification for 
I allowing him to recover to the extent of that insiders profit. 
As the Justice Report on insider trading stated: 83 
"when a director buys on the market in the knowledge of a 
forthcoming bid for the company, the seller of shares would 
probably have put his shares up for sale anyway and the 
price he gets may have been slightly raised by the fact that 
the director is in the market ~s a buyer the matching of 
vendor and purchaser is entirely random and there is no 
obvious justification for giving a vendor who happens to 
have sold shares to an insider a remedy which is not 
available to the vendors who sold at the same price to 
outsiders." 
83, Paragraph 2. 
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, 
The Justice Report recommended instead that criminal penalties be 
imposed, but with respect this approach is somewhat question 
begging. If it is accepted that insider trading is not fraud, 
that the insider in no way induces the sale, and that it in no 
case causes actual loss to the outsider/ it is difficult to 
sustain an argument for legislation at all. Some attempts have 
been made to establish a harm which is directly attritutable to 
84 insider trading, without however a great deal of success. 
Professor H. G. Manne, one of the principal opponents of 
legislation has claimed that the moral argument for a ban on 
insider trading is "self-righteous", "question begging", and 
"hypocrisy". 85 He states that: 
"Carried into the arena of serious debate on public policy, 
moral arguments are frequently either sham or a refuge for 
the intellectually bankrupt. Just because the phrase 
"insider trading" raises a spector of dishonesty and fraud 
exploitation and greed is not sufficient basis for assuming 
that fact must be so or that the practice must, ipso facto, 
be outlawed. 1186 
He disposes of the moral approach by insisting on proof of damage 
and he makes a number of significant points. The first is that 
only an extremely small fraction of the total number of shares are 
actively traded87 and of these, only a very few will be 
influenced by one of the parties having access to confidential 
84. Painter Federal regulation of Insidt!J> trading U.968) 555, Schotland (1969) 53 Va LR 1447-48, Mendelson 1969 ·117 U. Penn LR 4?3. Note also ~n Diamond v. Oreomuno 248 NE 2d 910 the attempt by the court to shav corporate harm through insider trading by way of Zoss of 'Pub lie acceptance and marketability of the sha:r>es." 
85, 1966 Harv. Bus. Rev. 113. 
86. Vand LR 1970 23: 549. 
8?. 0.27% per week in the U.S. 
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inside information: ''The absolute odds in favour of [the average 
investor] losing anything . as a result of insider trading are so 
small as to be unworthy of serious concern. 1188 The second point 
is that the outsider might even benefit from the presence of the 
insider in the market. 89 And the third ls that shareholders who 
do not trade in the pre-disclosure period are not harmed since 
they will ultimately benefit from the increased value of the 
shares. 
A further argument opposed to ''consumer" legislation in what is 
essentially a commercial situation is that it could be regarded as 
the "thin edge of the wedge" leading to wider and more extensive l regulation of business and related activities. It is ironic for 
instance that under the United States laws Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 
officials buying stock with knowledge of a new mineral strike have 
done something irrunoral for which they must be punished, but that 
the company itself buying surrounding land from the unknowing 
owners, using precisely the same information, has merely performed 
in a business-like manner and displayed considerable acumen.
90 
It would be difficult to justify a similar situation being created 
in New Zealand without some clear necessity for it. 
(ii} Market F.galitarianism 
Criticism of insider market activity derives some force from the 
view that it is not "fair" to others dealing on the market to have 
insiders trading on the basis of confidential information which 
88. Insider troding and the Stock Market 1966 p.91. 
89. Either as a buyer or sel Zer simplici ter or because they may be prepared to 
pay more., or accept less for the shares than would an outsider. 
90. While condemning the actions of the insiders., the court of appeals 
actually condoned the company's nvtives for delaying disclosure "a 
valuable corporote purpose was served by delaying the publication of the 
K-55-1 discovery". 401 F 2d 833, 85 O. 
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they do not disclose. There are some who claim that parties 
dealing with each other on the market should deal from an initial 
' 
position of equality and that the profit or loss from a securities 
transaction should be governed by the parties' market judgment 
rather than by access of one of them to material inside 
information. 
This sportsman's theory of the market requires that as far as 
possible trading in shares should be on the basis of an informed 
assessment of their worth and that the odds be the same for all 
who play the game. This will not be possible if only one party 
has access to certain relevant data and it is unfair not only 
because the other party has not got it, but that he cannot obtain 
it at all. 
This argument is generally categorised as one for "market 
egalitarianism" and, as a policy basis for a ban on insider 
trading it has been relied upon by a number of writers. 91 As a 
general theory however it is somewhat dampened by the fact that 
carried to its logical extreme it "would eliminate the use of all 
"informational" advantages" and would require that "parties to a 
transaction must under all circumstances inform each other of all 
material facts which they know, or should know are not known by 
the other party and are not publicly available. 119 2 
In addition it would be commercially naive to justify proscribing 
insider trading on this basis since in most commercial 
transactions involving speculative ~r investment purchases almost 
no-one discloses to the other party hi's true reasons for dealing 
and no-one has yet suggested that they should. The rule 
uberrimae fidei has a very limited application in commercial 
9~. E.g. Rider and French 95 SALJ ?9 (19?8); White, (19?4) 90 LQR 494. 
92. D. D, Prentice 19 ?5 CLP 92. 
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dealings generally93 and it is difficult to sustain an argument 
that a statutory form of ·the rule should apply to ·contracts for 
the sale of securities where there is little actual harm, but not 
apply in situations where loss is more e.asily shown. 9 4 
(iii) Investor Confidence 
It is another argument often made in favour of a ban on insider 
trading that investors and potential investors will channel their 
funds in other directions than the share market unless they are 
assured by a plethora of regulations that the integrity and the 
honesty of the market are assured, and that they will not be taken 
advantage of by unscrupulous insiders. 
Professor Loss, the author of the standard text on United States 
Securities laws has said: 95 
"Al though insider trading on undisclosed information may not 
present a threat of the same magnitude as market 
manipulation in the sense that the former practice does tend 
marginally to force the price in the same direction, it 
constitutes an even more grievous insult to the market in 
the sense that the very preservation of any capital market 
depends on 1 iquidity which rests in turn on the investors' 
confidence that current quotations accurately reflect the 
objective value of his investment." 
' 
93. I.e. it applies to oontructs of insumnoe and almost noohere else in the 
absence of fiduciary obligations. See Spencer Bower on actionable 
non-disclosure. 
94. E.g. in Te:rns Gulf Sulphur~ the buying of the land surrounding the mineral 
find. It was the company itself here which approached the surrounding 
land owners. Cf. the stock market where an outsider's decision to s e ll is 
formed independently of any other person's decision to buy and where there 
is no con met made between the parties. 
9 5. ( 19 7 0) 3 3 MLR 3 6, 
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In my view the accuracy of this supposition is questionable. One 
. h 'd 96 writer as sa1: 
"It is also hard to take this argument very seriously. 
Individual investor motivation is complex and factors other 
than consciousness of relative access to knowledge usually 
determine the small investors presence in or absence from 
the market. Increasingly the small investor is using 
institutional intermediaries, and his recognition of a 
knowledge disadvantage might simply accelerate this tendency 
rather than push him out of the market al together." 
I agree. Public confidence in the market depends on a large number 
of psychological and economic factors. The fact that insider 
trading is taking place would have a very limited effect on this 
confidence. 
Moreover, where anti insider trading legislation has been enacted 
there is no evidence that it has had the effect of drawing further 
investment and investors into the market. 
(b) Why not preserve the status quo? 
Aside from the fact that ultimately there is no loss caused to 
outsiders by insider trading there are a number of affirmative 
arguments which may indicate that it may be preferable not to 
initiate legislation to proscribe it. 
In the first place, the economic consequences of insider trading 
may not be wholly undesirable; second, the defects of the present 
situation may be outweighed by the disadvantages of legislation; 
96. Herman 2 1 U.C.L.A.L.R. 17. Cf. Rider and French 95 SALJ 96. 
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' and third, the practical irrperfections of legislation, the 
difficulties of enforcerre.nt, and the problems of definition may 
make it unreasonable to regulate for something which in the view 
of those rrost closely associated with it, is not a problem at 
all. 97 
(i) Stock Market Efficiency 
It appears to be commonly accepted that insider trading in the 
market tends to push share prices in the right direction and 
toward the levels at which they should stand, before they would 
otherwise rrove 98 and by so doing, makes the market more efficient. 
There is controversy however on whether this is a plus or a minus 
on the issue of legislation. 
One view is that the more efficiently the stock market functions 
the better off everyone is for a number of reasons. One is that 
capital will be allocated to its highest return uses;
99 another 
that violent market fluctuations will be diminished; and further 
that there will be continuity in price levels because insiders by 
making use of their special information {buying when share prices 
are declining without cause, and selling when they are 
artificially high) will provide the extra market force needed to 
cause a gradual levelling off of fluctuations, It is also argued 
that an efficient market is to be preferred to a fair one and 
encourages investor participation since it enables investors to 
verify that the market value of the shares is near to their true 
value . 100 
97, Macarthur repOl't paragraph 312, submission from the New Zealand Stock 
ExCYZange Association. 
98. Manne 1970 23 Vand LR 563, Loss., 1970 33 MLR 36., Rider and French 95 SALJ 
93-94. 
99. Manne 1970 23 Vand LR 561-566 ":rhe price of a company's stock is the best 
indicator of the performance record of existing management and the 
potential profitabi Zity of a takeover." 
100. This is because transactions based on insider information &'aW other 
transactions towards them, and formerly random transactions are dram 
tauards correct levels. 
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The opposing view is that insider trading only has a tendency to 
make the market more efficient; it does not actual,ly have the 
effect of making it so. As the few empirical studies which have 
been made show (and as Manne himself admits) the level of insider 
market activity is very low in relation to the total number of 
shares and share market transactions, and it appears that insider 
d ' h . ' f ' ' k . l O l Th h tra 1ng as no s1gn1 1cant impact on mar et prices. us t e 
claimed benefits may be more imaginary and theoretical than borne 
out in practice. 
In addition the claim that investors will be more attracted to an 
efficient market than a fair one is disputed. It is generally 
agreed that public confidence is the prime requirement for an 
effective stock market since if the investor loses confidence he 
will not invest, with the result that companies will not get 
capital. It is not agreed that this effectiveness is promoted by 
allowing insider trading to continue unfettered. "Markets, like 
the law, must seem to do equity. Otherwise the public will lose 
faith in them." Insider trading and market manipulation it is 
claimed go hand in hand. 102 The investor it is claimed should be 
able to be certain that the basis of every decision of managers is 
the interest of the company: "If the way were open to managers to 
profit themselves by their decisions there would be an undesirable 
effect on the mind of the shareholders. Again fairness must be 
seen to be done. 11103 
101. Rider and French 95 SALJ 95 referring to enpiricaZ studies by Wv (1963) 
and Fischer ( 19 65). 
102. Rider and French 95 SALJ 9?, Not e however Manne 19?0 23 Vand LR 5?5. He 
agrees that market manipulation ought to 'be prevented for the reason that 
it does add a high cos t to the functioning of the market. He claims 
however that market rranipu lation cliffers from insider trading just as a 
re liable tip on a horse differs from having a race "fixed", He says "If 
all insider trading could be effectively prevented there would probably be 
no fraudulent manipulation of stock prices either. But that does not 
decide the underlying issue about insider trading . , . , After all, 
outlC8JJing horse racing is the surest method of preventing fixed races. 11 
103, 95 SALJ 9?. 
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There is considerable force in both of these two conflicting 
views. The resolution of . the differences between them would seem 
to require more empirical research into individual investor 
motivation and the source of investor market confidence has been 
done. 
(iii) Reward for Entrepreneurs 
One of the more controversial arguments in favour of allowing 
insider trading is that it is an appropriate way in which to 
reward entrepreneurial activity in large corporations. 
According to Professor Manne entrepreneurial activity is essential 
for the growth of business and the economy. Hence 
entrepreneurial talents ought to be developed and promoted by 
allowing entrepreneurs to materially profit in direct proportion 
to the extent of their efforts: "Entrepreneurial activity produces 
the kind of good news to which the market prices respond. Hence 
the creator of good news who must inevitably know about it first 
is ideally situated to make a profit in the market from what he 
knows. Under ideal circumstances at least, insider trading thus 
has the advantage of tying the entrepreneurs reward directly to 
his contribution. 11104 
This proposal to allow entrepreneurs to engage in insider trading 
has drawn an angry and adverse response from many quarters. It is 
one argument put that the entrepreneurial talent has already been 
brought and paid for by the corporation
105 and another that the 
extent of the entrepreneurs profit is not the measure of his 
104. Heatherington 196? Wisconsin LR ?26. Restating Manne 's m>gwnents. 
105. Ibid at ?2?. For a discussion of who is an entrepreneur see also 
Mendelson 1969 11? U. Penn LR 48?. 
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talent but rather the extent of his resources and the number of 
shares which they will enable him to buy. Moreover it is clear 
that many people who are in a position to benefit from insider 
trading are not entrepreneurs. For example it is difficult to 
see why many of the enployees of Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., or why 
others who rnig~t have inside information such as lawyers, bankers, 
or investment brokers should be entitled to entrepreneurial 
reward. 
Professor Manne observes however that the occasions when insiders 
get returns to which they are not entitled by trading on inside 
information, may balance those when they fail to get rewards to 
which they are entitled. He argues as well that allowing 
entrepreneurs to profit in this manner will relieve companies of 
the obligation to pay for these specialised kind of 
entrepreneurial talents and may serve to attract into management 
positions those who would otherwise be unwilling to act in a 
managerial capacity. 
His argument is certainly not conclusive in favour of not having 
legislation. It is one factor which must be considered, however, 
that one of the results of this may be that companies and their 
shareholders profit thereby. 106 
(iv) The realities of partial enforcement 
A further argument is made that the realities of legislation and 
the problem of resources for investigation and prosecution of 
insider abuses mitigates strongly in favour of the status quo. It 
is clear that in order to control insider trading it would not be 
sufficient merely to enact legislation outlawing it, there must 
106. Via the profitability for the company of entrepreneW'iaZ activity by its 
employees, and the direct savings resulting if material benefit for the 
exercise of entrepreneurial ta. Zents comes from soUI'ces outside of the 
C cmp:1, rt}j • 
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also be an effective method of enforcing this law and it is a sad 
fact of government that far too often with similar legislative 
provisions, there are insufficient resources made available for 
effective enforcement commensurate to the size of the problem. 
Decisions would have to be made about wnere limited resources 
should be applied and enforcement may become both arbitrary and 
discriminatory. 
It would be impossible to prevent insider abuses altogether, they 
are too elusive and the potential for them in the stock market 
structure far too wide to permit full detection and adequate 
control. All that legislation may do is place a premium on 
innovation and the ability to conceal interests in transactions in 
such a way as to avoid the attention of the enforcement agency. 
It must at least be asked in these circumstances whether the 
government should attempt to validate a myth of equal investor 
opportunity when it would be little more than a legislative 
deception of the public. 
It has been argued that the function of the legislation is to 
inspire market confidence in intrepid investors, thus causing them 
to make further investments and to this end, it does not matter 
that the legislation is only "cosmetic" and incapable of complete 
enforcement. One must seriously doubt the validity of this 
argument however in terms of legislative policy and the 
philosophy of government intervention in private sector activities. 
I have suggested above that insider-trading has only a tangential 
bearing if any at all, on individual investor confidence in the 
market. It is difficult to see that this confidence would be 
increased by "cosmetic" legislation which was incapable of effective~y 
proscribing insider trading. Quite the reverse in fact. It is 
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suggested that if legislation was enacted it would serve only to 
focus attention on the practice and thus damage the protective 
cocoon of obscurity and lack of knowledge which presently exists 
in the minds of many market investors. In addition if legislation 
was to be enacted similar to that in force elsewhere it may pave 
the way for greater investor insecurity in the market than 
presently exists. In just the same way that shareholders' 
confidence in the ability of the present law to control the 
activities of errant directors would have been shaken by the 
result of the recent criminal prosecution of the J.B.L. directors, 
so too would the result in cases such as Green v. Charterhouse 
Corporation107 and Ryan v. Triguboff108 fail to inspire investor 
confidence in the honesty of the market and the integrity of the 
legislation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is important to bear in mind that the decision whether or not 
to legislate for insider trading involves nothing more than a 
value judgment involving weighing up the relative merits of 
outlawing something which appears unethical, dishonest, and seems 
to involve unjust enrichment of an insider, against the 
disadvantage of creating legislation which can never be fully 
enforced, will possibly not enure to the benefit of any 
individual, or to business generally, and which may not even be 
necessary at all. It may be that the validity of this decision 
would be incapable of being verified '- bY. empirical or statistical 
research. 
107. (1973) 35 DLR 3d 161 affiY'med (1976) 68 DLR. 
108. 19 76 1 NSWLR. 
• • 
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While legal restraints on the misuse of inside information are 
possibly very desirable, largely on equity grounds, it must also 
be recognised that it will be impossible to curb insider abuses 
entirely. It is clear from the above discussion that the problem 
in the context of face to face transacti'ons is already adequately 
provided for at common law following Coleman v. Myers 109 and that 
vis-a-vis the company to whom insiders owe fiduciary 
responsibilities the balance is more than adequate in favour of 
the company - perhaps even to much so bearing in mind that the 
company is unable to have a financial interest in dealings in its 
own shares. The dilemma of legislation therefore exists solely in 
the context of market activities. 
The argument may be made that outlawing insider trading will cause 
companies to make public disclosure of information at an earlier 
time than they otherwise would. This ignores however that a 
1 · · b d b d 1 · d' 1 110 eg1t1mate corporate purpose may e serve y e ay1ng 1sc osure 
and that in fact, as in Percival v. Wright, untimely disclosure of 
information which subsequently proves abortive may work to the 
detriment of those who buy or sell on the strength of it. 
The argument may also be made that the moral imperative of insider 
trading demands legislation purporting to prevent it. Against 
this however must be balanced the legislative inertia in favour of 
the status quo absent proof of necessity and in this case absent 
proof of damage. Whether as a matter of accident or deliberate 
public policy, it is clear that legislation is not usually enacted 
unnecessarily, and where it is unnecessary it should be repealed. 
The onus of proof therefore in this'· situation undoubtedly lies ;--, 
with the proponents of legislation to show why it is needed, 
rather than with opponents to show why it is not. 
109, L.197?] 2 NZLR 225. 
110. E.g. if disclosure had been made by Texas Gulf Sulphur it would ha:ve lost 
its adm.ntage in negotiations with owners of Zand surrounding the TGS strike. 
The Court recognised delay here as a Zegitunate corpol"Clte purpose ( 401 F. 
2d 833, 850). 
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The moral imperitive against legislation is clearly stronger in 
the case where an insider -sells shares knowing th~t their value is 
to drop than where he buys them knowing that the price is likely 
to rise. In my view the arguments made for and against 
legislation hold good in both cases, namely that the outsider 
would have bought or sold the shares irrespective of whether the 
insider was dealing in the market and therefore ought to be denied 
recovery, but it may be that if we are to enact legislation at all 
it should be done in line with the recommendation of the Macarthur 
Committee and provide for recovery only when shares are sold by an 
insider which subsequently drop in value. Equity would certainly 
favour such a result, and investor confidence as well may be 
strengthened if investors realise that although recovery will be 
precluded of II lost" profits through insider trading, it will be 
possible to compel insiders to disgorge gains made directly to the 
detriment of market buyers with whom they trade. 
As an alternative for specific anti-insider trading provisions 
might it not be preferable instead to modify and strengthen the 
disclosure provisions for insiders under the Companies Act along 
the lines of section 16(a) of the United States Securities 
Exchange Act 1934, with or without the statutory disgorgement rule 
provided for in section 16(b)? In my view it would, if we are to 
have anything at all, for the reasons of simplicity, enforcement, 
and cost. Ours is only a small securities market in comparison 
with those in other countries and there is a high degree of 
institutional involvement as well as considerable public scrutiny 
of reported share dealings. 111 Compulsory disclosure and the fact 
that most insiders would not like it' to be known that they are 
taking advantage of inside information may be all that is required 
to keep the practice under reasonable control. 
Lll. . As witness the recent Lion/Androcles affair, 
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' Legislation should clearly not be enacted in the absence of some 
clear necessity112 or without far greater investigation than has 
so far been done of the extent of the problem, its relationship to 
invididual investor motivation, and the likely effect, both good 
and bad, which legislation will have. In particular we should 
consider in some depth the effect of legisation in Australia and 
the extent to which it has benefitted the market place, business, 
and investors generally, and we should watch with some 
considerable interest proposals for further reform which are soon 
to emerge from the United Kingdom as a follow-up to the aborted 
bills of 1973 and 1978. 
112. On what might constitute necessity see for emmple R. Baxt "the Rae Report 
- Quo Vadis" on the situation giving rise to legislation in Austn:ilia. 
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